IN mid-1996, a book titled "China Can Say No" was published and enjoyed wide popularity across the country.
Its authors severely criticized the hostile US foreign policy towards China.
Last September, China responded strongly to the actions of Japanese rightists who built a light-house on China's Diaoyu Islands.
Some politically biased Western scholars and politicians have been trying to take advantage of the events to spread fears that China is engaged in a nationalist campaign. Some even went so far as to label the Chinese xenophobes.
For instance, Professor Lucian Pye from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology said in a recent International Herald Tribune article that the Chinese now embrace a nationalism "that is little more than racist passion."
The nationalism (or "patriotism" which Chinese prefer to use) accepted by the Chinese are reasonable national sentiments and do not constitute xenophobia.
Michael Lind, executive editor of The National Interest, said in a 1994 Foreign Affairs article, nationalism is "the simple idea that every nation should have its own state -- accompanied by the corollary that one ethnic or cultural group should not collectively rule over another."
Nationalism or patriotism inspired by foreign criticism over a country's sovereignty and self-respect is quite justified and cannot be simply interpreted as xenophobia -- unreasonable fear or dislike of foreigners.
It is the same case with China's history of nationalism in the sense of nation-state.
The nationalism surging in the late Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and the first half of this century was primarily directed to alien enslavement. It greatly inspired the Chinese to win national independence and the founding of a sovereign state -- the People's Republic of China. It was not xenophobic and did not cause massive anti-foreign hatred.
Since 1979, China has begun to open up to the outside world and has scored great economic achievements. China's economic opening to the outside world also brings unprecedented cultural exchanges between Western countries and China.
The Chinese are excited about the coming of an age of transnationalism. However, as they know more about the outside world, they are also aware of the fact that China's efforts to develop its economy and join the world community have always been frustrated by Western countries. For instance, the US's tough stance on China's entry into the World Trade Organization. At the same time, the national self-respect of the Chinese is frequently hurt by international infringements on China's sovereignty.
Infuriated by Japanese ultra-rightists' new move on the Diaoyu Islands last September, Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan staged strong anti-Japanese protests; national sentiments on the mainland surged, too. But thinking about the huge damages Japan caused to China during World War II and the current revival of Japan's militarism, one has to admit that the response of the Chinese towards the Diaoyu Islands incident is rational and valid.
According to Lucian Pye, the Chinese public love to hate the West (especially the United States) out of their frustrated feelings, which result from a lack of "a more coherent sense of modern identity." Pye seems to hold the view that China is now "a spiritual wasteland" with no solid moorings for its people.
Chinese in pursuit of a better life tend to be more practical, but their pragmatism is spiritually rooted in the now popular work ethic that one will get more if one works harder. It is guaranteed by China's ongoing reform towards market economy.
Pye's conclusion is farfetched in that Chinese national sentiments have resulted from their awakening consciousness of protecting national interests rather than from "frustration."
The Chinese public has begun to realize that their individual interests are more closely related to the national interest. However, patriotic Chinese are definitely not xenophobes. Instead, they are open-minded and friendly to their foreign friends.
It seems to me that the latest allegation in the West about China's "xenophobic nationalism" is specially designed to justify the conception (if not policy) of containing China.
Though the Cold War has ended, the West, headed by the United States, did not discard the containment strategy against China. Those who want to make China weak have to find new support for the policy of containing China.
The theory of the "China threat" was created to serve as the theoretical basis for the new containment policy aimed at China. The theory assumes various forms. Following the fabrications of "the Confucian China" and "the China threatening world food security," this time, it is the "xenophobic nationalist China."
Obviously, the new containment strategy stems from an old-fashioned philosophy of foreign affairs and an improper geopolitical rationale of the United States.
Over the past few years, the United States has infused a strong sense of ideological and moral superiority into its hostile policy towards China. Such a policy is outdated now that most countries agree that ideological confrontation should give way to mutual understanding and co-operation in dealing with bilateral ties.
The United States should also modify its current geopolitical rationale. Judging from its history and present foreign policy, China is not an expansionist country. The Chinese Government has reiterated that China does not and will not threaten the geopolitical interests of its neighbours, not to mention those of the United States. China's stance is based on its own interests. Instead, China has vowed to contribute to the maintenance of regional stability and commits itself to political and economic co-operation with other countries.
The Clinton administration lately has been said to have substituted "engagement" for containment for its policy towards China. I hope that such a change of China policy is based on US realization of the importance of China and of the fact that China is not taking the road of "xenophobic nationalism."