美国新闻发言人在新闻发布会上被问及对南海仲裁案的看法,该发言人认为既然菲律宾与中国是联合国海洋公约的签署国(美国不是联合国海洋公约的签署国),就应该遵守仲裁决定。 然后记者问,如果中国不遵守那又怎么办? 该新闻发言人称:判决下来了,责任在他们(中国与菲律宾)。仲裁书有500页,我们也没看完。 记者问,如果中国不遵守仲裁决定,是否违背国际法。 美国发言人称:是。 然后记者问:能不能问下,美国在什么时候遵守过对自己不利的判决? 美国发言人说:我找找。 记者道:不要去找尼加拉瓜(大笑)。 这位美国发言人说:你看来往前面翻了。我找找。找到了(一个美国与加拿大争端的例子)。 关于尼加拉瓜,发言人说,后来两国之间解决了。再说,他(发言人)不是律师,历史学的也一般。美国在各自争端上不站立场。 记者又问道对太平岛被裁决为“石块”的看法,是否会影响美国与台湾的关系。 发言人(不知是否知道太平岛)称不管怎样,不影响美国的一个中国政策。 Daily Press Briefing - July 12, 2016 (1)-1.mp4 MR KIRBY: -- will abide by its legally binding obligations under this decision. So it just got rendered. Let’s see where we go from here. QUESTION: And last one from me on this. Since foreign policy is more than hopes and expectations -- MR KIRBY: Should be, yeah. QUESTION: -- how do you plan to ensure that China will indeed abide by this ruling? Or are you just -- MR KIRBY: Well, look, as I -- QUESTION: -- just going to hope for that? Or -- MR KIRBY: As I said in my opening comments, the onus is on them. The decision has been rendered. For our part it’s some 500 pages. We’re still going through it so we can better understand it here. I suspect that the claimants are probably still reading through it, as it is pretty lengthy. But the onus is on them now. The tribunal has spoken, and it’s up to the parties now to abide by their legally binding obligations in there. QUESTION: Can I follow up? QUESTION: If China fails to abide by the ruling, then it will be in breach of international law? MR KIRBY: Yes. QUESTION: A follow-up. In a statement you said you ask for all parties to respect the rule of law and you support arbitration. Can you give me any example that the United States has ever complied with any of the rulings on international arbitration, particularly when it’s weighed against your interest? MR KIRBY: Yeah, actually I think I’ve got one in here somewhere. Hang on a second. I know I’ve got one in here. QUESTION: Don’t look in Nicaragua. (Laughter.) MR KIRBY: You’ve been reading ahead, haven’t you? Ah, where is it? Here we go. I knew I’d find it. So we believe an example can be found in the resolution of a contentious and long-disputed maritime boundary between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine. To resolve that dispute, the U.S. and Canada brought the legal question to third-party dispute settlement before a chamber of the International Court of Justice and argued the case on its merits and complied with the decision. So we have – we’ve done this ourselves. QUESTION: But you know, as Brad just mentioned, there are other cases that you didn’t really complying with the ruling. And there was this article yesterday written by the Harvard professor Graham Allison. Actually, he pointed out that none of the UN security permanent members, none of them has ever applied by the ruling of the permanent court of arbitration when it comes to the issue about their sovereignty or the Law of the Sea. MR KIRBY: That doesn’t change the fact that it’s a legally binding decision. That might – that’s very interesting. I’m not a lawyer, but it doesn’t seem relevant to the fact that this tribunal decision is legally binding. And on Nicaragua, so I’m told – or at least I have here – that this case was over 30 years ago in which the U.S. participated at a jurisdictional stage. The U.S. and Nicaragua ultimately resolved this case bilaterally, which Nicaragua withdrew their position voluntarily. So just so you know I got that in there. But again, to your – I haven’t read this gentleman’s argument, and I’m no lawyer. I was barely a good history student, so – what I can tell you, though, is that this is a legally binding decision and it’s our expectation – and, oh – and frankly, it’s the world’s expectation. This is – it’s not just the United States. The world is watching now to see what these claimants will do. The world is watching to see if China is really the global power it professes itself to be and the responsible power that it professes itself to be. The world’s watching this. QUESTION: Yes. Just to follow up on that, other great powers before – as I mentioned, the UN Security Council members, they haven’t even complied with their ruling before. So how would you expect China to comply with the ruling? MR KIRBY: Again, I think that’s an interesting case that’s not relevant. I mean, your argument is not relevant. This is a – I can’t speak for every other member of the UN Security Council. I gave you two examples where the United States worked these kinds of things out peacefully, one through arbitration. It is a legally – there’s no dispute here. I understand that the Chinese have made an argument that they’re not going to abide by it. I’ve heard that loud and clear, okay. But that doesn’t change the fact that it’s still a legally binding obligation. And it’s the world’s expectation that China will abide by its obligations under this legally binding decision. QUESTION: What if China doesn’t? MR KIRBY: I’m not going to get into hypotheticals. China should care about abiding by it, because China should care about the fact that the entire world is watching what they’ll do now, in this – in the event of the tribunal’s decision. QUESTION: And the final one. In a statement, you also mentioned you – we are still studying the decision and have no comment on the merits of the case. Does that mean you may not necessarily agree with all the rulings? Because one of that Taiwan actually objected was the island Taiwan controlled called Taiping Island and the arbitration ruling said it’s a rock instead of island. MR KIRBY: I’m – what I’m – my comment stands. We’re – it’s a 500-page decision. We’re still working our way through it; it just got rendered today. And so I’m not going to make any specific comment on this particular case. QUESTION: But if you haven’t studied – if you haven’t finished studying it, how can you support everything the -- MR KIRBY: We certainly – we are certainly familiar enough with the decision and the components of it to say what we say before it got rendered, which is it will be legally binding. I’ve said the same thing for a matter of days now, even before we knew what it was – that it was going to be legally binding and that the expectation would be that all claimants would abide by their responsibilities under it. That point hasn’t changed since before the decision got rendered, and it’s certainly not going to change now. I’m not going to talk about the specifics of the case, as you – as I’ve said also many times, the United States isn’t taking a position on individual claims. We do take a position on coercion and the use of force or military pressure to try to change or to try to affect the outcome on these claims. We’ve long said that we want these disputes resolved peacefully, in accordance with international law. This tribunal decision represents that law and, again, it’s our expectation that all sides are going to abide by it. Okay. QUESTION: Can I ask – just following up on this – I mean -- MR KIRBY: Who are you? QUESTION: Nick Wadhams from Bloomberg. MR KIRBY: Okay. QUESTION: So China already responded to your statement, filing a solemn representation, basically protesting it. We had Senator Dan Sullivan today calling for a review of U.S. force posture in Asia, possibly considering putting a second aircraft carrier strike group in the region in response to this ruling. So what is the next step for the U.S.? It was totally anticipated that China would reject this ruling. They’ve now done so. Aside from urging them to adhere to a ruling that we already knew they were not going to respect, what is your next step? MR KIRBY: Well, it’s day one. And the next steps are for the parties to determine, not for the United States to determine. As I said, the onus is on them now to abide by the obligations set forth in the decision. It’s day one, so let’s see where it goes. And I’m not going to get -- QUESTION: But -- MR KIRBY: Wait a second. I’m not going to get ahead of hypothetical situations of what the United States will or won’t do. We – our expectation, the world’s expectation is that all claimants – both claimants in this case – are going to abide by their obligations. So let’s see if that actually happens. And then I’m certainly not going to speak to hypothetical military movements one way or the other. We have a strong presence in the Asia Pacific, not – for a variety of reasons, not aimed at any one country. And I don’t see any change to that presence. In fact, it’s all part of the President’s rebalance to the Asia Pacific, where you have a majority of the U.S. Navy out there as well as many assets from other of the services. Now we’re – we – five of our seven – five of our seven security alliances are in the Pacific region. We have enormous commitments from a security perspective that we absolutely will abide by. But I’m not going to speculate one way or the other about intransigence on this and what that might mean for military posture going forward. QUESTION: Now, given that China has now basically made this a bilateral issue by directly protesting your statement, I mean, does the Secretary have any plan for contact with Wang Yi again? Are there any channels that you guys are going to open up with the Chinese about – I mean, it seems like we’ve now moved pretty far beyond both sides calling for abstaining from provocative statements. I mean, we’ve now got pretty provocative statements on both sides. MR KIRBY: It doesn’t mean that we’re going to stop urging restraint and calm and sensibility and a sense of maturity and leadership in the wake of this decision. Those are still required. Number two, as I mentioned, he did speak to Foreign Minister Wang Yi before – obviously a few days ago – before the decision. I don’t have any future phone calls to announce today or to speak to, but he routinely speaks to his Chinese counterpart on a range of issues, and I suspect those conversations are going to continue. And as for opening up new channels, there’s no need to do that. We have lots of communication channels open with the Chinese here at the State Department, the Defense Department as well, and of course, the President also has a way of communicating with President Xi. So there’s lots of ways that we will continue to stay in touch with China going forward. QUESTION: John, can I follow up on Itu Aba? MR KIRBY: On what? QUESTION: Itu Aba, the Taiping Island in the South China Sea. Can I follow up on that quickly? MR KIRBY: Sure. QUESTION: I’m not going to quiz you on 500-page details of the ruling. (Laughter.) MR KIRBY: Good. QUESTION: Itu Aba – some called Taiping Island – is the largest land feature in the Spratlys chain. And so today’s ruling, to some of the legal experts, a little bit surprising because it was defined as rock, not island. Given the fact that Taiwan has about 200 people post in Taiping or Itu Aba, what role does the United States want Taiwan to play going forward? MR KIRBY: Well, look, again, I’m not going to speak to the specifics of this case, as I said at the outset. Nothing’s changed about our “one China” policy and our desire to see cross-strait relations be productive and peaceful. But other than that, I’m not going to comment. QUESTION: Shouldn’t Taiwan be – does the United States consider bringing Taiwan to a negotiation table to – when trying to find a peaceful and diplomatic way to solve the disputes? MR KIRBY: I know of no such plans. Again, nothing’s changed about our “one China” policy, nothing. Barbara. QUESTION: In March, the Chinese pulled back from what looked like land reclamation plans for the Scarborough Shoal, reportedly under U.S. pressure. Just wondered if you were confident that they would keep that stance after this ruling or whether there was sort of diplomatic exchanges or urges from here that they don’t take that action. MR KIRBY: We have been nothing but consistent for many months about our concerns about militarization of features in the South China Sea. President Xi, when he was here standing next to President Obama, made clear that they weren’t going to do that. We have seen some signs in recent weeks that some of that activity continues, and we have been, again, very consistent, very clear with our Chinese counterparts about our ongoing concern with – in that regard, and that’s not going to change. Now, I can’t possibly speculate what China may or may not do going forward after this decision, but they themselves have committed to not militarizing features, and that’s our expectation. And frankly, that’s the expectation of plenty of countries there in the region and many countries around the world. Yeah. QUESTION: Mr. Kirby, very quickly, you said you are consistently concerned about land reclamation activities by China. Some people in China point out that, in fact, China is hardly the first country to do so. Vietnam, the Philippines did that in past, but in those cases the U.S. was not so eager to project their anger or protest. Is there a double standard here? MR KIRBY: Look, I’m not going – again, we’re not taking individual positions on individual claims, but I think it’s a far cry and a stretch to compare what China has done in just recent months and certainly over the last year or so with land reclamation and militarization with any such potential like situations from other countries in the region. There’s absolutely no way to compare the scope and the size and the character of it. QUESTION: But from your statement this afternoon, it seems that Washington can imply, if not dictate, what countries in the region in South China Sea should or should not do based on a piece of treaty, UNCLOS – which, of course, the U.S. did not ratify. This Administration, along with others -- MR KIRBY: And we continue to urge the Senate to -- QUESTION: -- tried to push for it, but you never get the two-third majority of the Senate. MR KIRBY: We continue to urge the Senate to ratify. We’ve -- QUESTION: Do you think the U.S. -- MR KIRBY: This Administration has been very, very clear about that. But we still abide by the central tenets of it, even though we aren’t a signer. QUESTION: But when you abide by the central tenets, do you think the U.S. loses kind of the moral authority to do that when it does not ratify it? MR KIRBY: This isn’t about expressing moral authority, and I kind of reject the implication in the question. This isn’t about the United States projecting moral authority. This is an international tribunal which came up with a legally binding decision that the United States didn’t influence. We said before that they reached it that it would be legally binding; so did the world. Now they’ve reached it; it’s still legally binding, and the world is going to be watching what both claimants do in terms of meeting their obligations on this. As I said at the outset, the United States doesn’t take a position on individual claims. We do take a position on coercion, and part of coercion is the potential militarization of land features that appear to have only one outcome in mind, and that is to press, potentially through force, these claims when those claims ought to be settled through exactly this kind of a process. QUESTION: And finally, do you think the U.S. in any ways contributed to the rising of tensions, militarization in South China Sea when they send bombers and cruisers, frigates in the region so often? MR KIRBY: No, I don’t, and here’s why: The United States military has a presence in the Pacific. We are a Pacific power. Five of our seven treaty alliances are in the Pacific. We have enormous security commitments in the region. And when we operate our ships and our aircraft, we do so in international airspace and international maritime space, and we train with our allies and our partners. And those are serious obligations, because our military has an – has a responsibility to protect and defend the United States national security interests. And we’ve been doing that for a long time, well before these issues in the South China Sea came up. So the short answer is, no, I don’t. Said. QUESTION: Can we move to a new topic? MR KIRBY: Yeah. QUESTION: Are we done? QUESTION: Just follow on that point – in the statement, you asked for all claimants to avoid provocative actions and rhetorics. Does that also include United States? MR KIRBY: The United States isn’t committing provocative rhetoric or actions. I’ve said, again, we don’t take a position on these claims, and our military operations in the region are 100 percent aligned -- QUESTION: (Off-mike.) MR KIRBY: Listen, now, I know where you’re going here. I get that you don’t like this, but that doesn’t make it less true, that our military operations in the region are designed to look after U.S. national security interests, including the interests of five of our seven treaty alliances. We have enormous responsibilities. We have been and remain and will remain a Pacific power. And so as the Secretary of Defense has said, we’re going to fly, sail, and operate in accordance with international law where we need to to protect those interests. That is not something new. That is something that the United States military takes very seriously, and has for decades – well before this discussion was even being had about the South China Sea. Said. QUESTION: Can we go to Syria? MR KIRBY: Yeah. QUESTION: Yeah. Today -- MR KIRBY: I can’t believe I’m actually glad to move on to Syria. (Laughter.)
南海仲裁案结果出来前,人们就已经质疑由 国际海洋法庭 庭长、安倍晋三谋士、日本右翼鹰牌人士 柳井俊二 挑选仲裁员的正当性。 菲律宾提起仲裁案时, 国际海洋法庭 庭长是日本人 柳井俊二 。此人从1961年起在日本外务省任职40年,官自外务省次长,曾任日本驻美国大使。2007起充当安倍智囊。 2015年被安倍晋三任命为日本新《安保法》的首席顾问, 为日本修宪、解禁集体自卫权等议题寻找法律依据并提供理论及策略支持, 是日本军事扩张政策的幕后推手。海牙仲裁庭的仲裁员除菲律宾指定一人之外,其余均由安倍谋士 柳井亲自挑选。 现在这位日本柳井出来自我辩护了。 根据 日本时报报道 ,柳井俊二称: “这些(日本)因素与案子完全没有关系。我只是正好是个日本人,但是海洋公约条款规定,如果仲裁双方没有指定仲裁员,那么国际海洋法庭庭长必须做这个事。我遵守了这些规定,是作为海洋法庭庭长,不是作为日本人的代表。我在法庭里完全不代表日本人。这相当明显。” ( “these factors are completely irrelevant to this case.” “I just happen to be a Japanese, but the annex to the convention provides that in case the arbitrators are not appointed by the parties or by agreement by the parties then the president of ITLOS must do it,” Yanai said. “I followed exactly these provisions. As the president of ITLOS, I didn’t act as a Japanese representative. I don’t represent the Japanese at all in the tribunal. That is quite obvious.” ) 柳井俊二的继续辩解之余,不忘对中国进行贬损:“这是个法律机构。不是一个联合国政治机构。。。这些仲裁员都是非常有知识的,品质好的。 在国际社会,除了中国,对这个组成都很认可 。” (“ And in the international community, this constitution was very well received — except by China.” ) 言下之意,中国是不尊重法律的。 为了证明日本人的公正,《日本时报》的报道称, 柳井俊二发现他指定的一名仲裁员配偶是菲律宾人之后,就把此人替换下来。借用一位评论者的话说,这个换人说明 柳井公正、无偏见。 不过人们会问,既然仲裁员的配偶是菲裔都得替换, 柳井俊二为何就不觉得他自己应该靠边呢? 菲裔不见得敌视中国,跟菲裔结婚也不见得就敌视中国,但即使如此,菲裔的配偶充当南海仲裁员也是不当的。这一点 柳井俊二承认了,他换了人。 而 柳井俊二本人,这位日本外交官、安倍的谋士,却是实实在在敌视中国 -- 在钓鱼岛问题上, 柳井俊二声称尖阁列岛面临敌人(enemy)的威胁。而这个敌人当然就是中国。 法官的道德操守的第一条就是要规避利益冲突(avoid conflict of interest)、至少维护表面上的公正。如果这一条基本的道德操守都明知故犯,可谓品质低劣。 日本法官伪装的公正恰恰暴露了他实质的品质低劣。 南海仲裁庭从一开始就带着日本右翼的基因,其所谓仲裁结果缺乏基本的程序正当性。 值得庆幸的是,今天的中国已经不再是1931年的中国。 人类文明之间的争夺靠实力。海牙仲裁并没有就中国对南海诸岛的主权进行判断(也无权判断),而是说它们(包括菲律宾驻扎了人的)都不是岛,没有200海里专属经济区。在南海,中国应该采取的行动是武力驱逐占领中国若干岛屿的菲律宾人。夺回这些岛的控制权。 附件:海牙仲裁庭“AWARD” PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf
联合国食物与农业组织发布一份两百页题为《可吃昆虫: 食物保障的未来》的报告,下载链接 http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3253e/i3253e.pdf 以强有力的科学证据证明人们应该多吃虫子。根据这份报告,目前世界上有20亿人口通过食用昆虫补充蛋白质。昆虫具有高蛋白与矿物质,而且有利于环境。 常见的可吃昆虫包括:甲壳虫、毛虫、蜜蜂、黄蜂、蚂蚁、蚂蚱、蝗虫、蟋蟀、蝉,等等。 昆虫非常高效,能将两公斤饲料转换为一公斤昆虫质量,而家畜需要9公斤饲料,才能转换为1公斤肉。 Which_Bugs_Are_Safest_to_Eat_and_Tastiest.mp4 UN urges people to eat insects to fight world hunger Comments (720) Over 2 billion people worldwide already supplement their diet with insects Continue reading the main story Related Stories Would you eat bugs instead of meat? Watch The locust-eaters of Israel What will we be eating in 20 years' time? Eating more insects could help fight world hunger, according to a new UN report. The report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization says that eating insects could help boost nutrition and reduce pollution. It notes than over 2 billion people worldwide already supplement their diet with insects. However it admits that "consumer disgust" remains a large barrier in many Western countries. Continue reading the main story Insect nutritional value /100g Food source Protein (g) Calcium (mg) Iron (mg) Source: Montana State University Caterpillar 28.2 n/a 35.5 Grasshopper 20.6 35.2 5 Dung beetle 17.2 30.9 7.7 Minced beef 27.4 n/a 3.5 Discover more about insects More on protein and healthy eating Wasps, beetles and other insects are currently "underutilised" as food for people and livestock, the report says. Insect farming is "one of the many ways to address food and feed security". "Insects are everywhere and they reproduce quickly, and they have high growth and feed conversion rates and a low environmental footprint," according to the report. Nutritional value The authors point out that insects are nutritious, with high protein, fat and mineral content. They are "particularly important as a food supplement for undernourished children". Insects are also "extremely efficient" in converting feed into edible meat. Crickets, for example, need 12 times less feed than cattle to produce the same amount of protein, according to the report. Most insects are are likely to produce fewer environmentally harmful greenhouse gases than other livestock. The ammonia emissions associated with insect-rearing are far lower than those linked to conventional livestock such as pigs, says the report. Delicacies The report calls for insect dishes to be added to restaurant menus Insects are regularly eaten by many of the world's population, but the thought may seem shocking to many Westerners. The report suggests that the food industry could help in "raising the status of insects" by including them in new recipes and adding them to restaurant menus. It goes on to note that in some places, certain insects are considered delicacies. For example some caterpillars in southern Africa are seen as luxuries and command high prices. Most edible insects are gathered in forests and serve niche markets, the report states. It calls for improved regulation and production for using insects as feed. "The use of insects on a large scale as a feed ingredient is technically feasible, and established companies in various parts of the world are already leading the way," it adds.
16年前,我在《 钓鱼岛中日决战 》中写道,【中国应加强与俄国的军事合作,增加互相的信赖感。。。如果 能在未来的中日战争中借重俄国的力量,联合韩国,对倭寇三面围剿,必置军国主义于死地。 对于美国,则晓之以害、诱之以利可矣。 】 也就是说,钓鱼岛问题美国因素通过外交、经济手段即可排除。 两个星期前,针对各种美国是否会介入钓鱼岛争端的讨论,我在《 美国的战略模糊及其底牌 》中写道,【 假如中国自己被吓得软了,老美就可以出来对日本人说,嘿嘿,还不谢谢我罩着?如果中国人真发狠打了,老美可以站在一边, 说这是你们中日之间一衣带血几百年的恩怨,两个民族自己解决,我们美国给你们和平的祝愿 。。。】 中国对日本采取一系列强硬措施,并在联合国宣示立场之后, 美国在联合国发话表态了 ,不再提什么美日安保条约,而是下列容: 【"We have indicated quite clearly that this is a matter for diplomacy between the two countries, and the United States has no intention and we are not playing a mediating role. We have high confidence in the judgment and recognition on both sides of the importance of this relationship. We think it is appropriate. … We think it is a responsible view as well. So the United States is not going to play that kind of role going forward."】 简单翻译如下, 美国认为南中国海与东海的主权争议由来已久 ,日中关系对日中双方都很重要,相信中日双方都能认识到这一点,钓鱼岛争端是中日之间的事情,今后美国不会在中日之间担任调停角色。 http://v.ifeng.com/include/exterior.swf?AutoPlay=falseguid=97d67a11-aecc-4652-839c-9530843e7bb0fromweb=ZHVPlayer
JOHN TOLAND写的《IN MORTAL COMBAT -- Korea, 1950-1953》(TOLAND曾获普利策奖)这本关于朝鲜战争的这本著作参阅了很多解密的原始资料,其描述相对比较全面。书的封底介绍到:【 In Mortal Combat reveals Mao's prediction of the date and place of MacArthur's Inchon landing, Russia's indifference to the war, Mao's secret leadership of the North Korean military...】 这些内容,应该是英文读者以前不知道的。 正如上面总结所言,苏联对于朝鲜战争的态度可以说是观望性的、冷淡的,苏联的战略重心在欧洲,而不是远东。美军在仁川登陆,然后夺回汉城之后,斯大林拒绝了北朝鲜的求助,他的建议是让金日成放弃朝鲜、到中国组建流亡政府 (Toland. p.240)。 联合国在仁川登陆之后通过决议,授权美军征服并占领整个北朝鲜。1950年10月6日,联合国军越过38线,进入北朝鲜境内。美军的目标是摧毁北朝鲜全部军 事力量,实现朝鲜统一。10月8日,麦克阿瑟通过电台要求金日成投降。同一天,美参谋长联席会议命令麦克阿瑟在攻击中国境内目标时必须先得到华盛顿的批 准。由此可见,美国对于美军的军事行动的范围并没有明确加以限制,也没有排除对中国境内目标实施军事打击的可能,而是抱一种见机行事的态度。 美国人对苏联的态度其实非常清楚。1950年10月8日,美军战斗机深入苏联远东境内60英里,攻击了一个苏军机场。但苏联并没有强烈反应。10月15日, 杜鲁门在威克岛就中国与苏联参战的可能性向麦克阿瑟将军进行了咨询。麦克阿瑟的判断是,中国、苏联已经错过军事干预的最佳时机。”We are no longer fearful of their intervention"。 麦克阿瑟对于中国的分析是:中国人在满洲有30万兵力,其中12万5千部署在鸭绿江沿线,渡过鸭绿江的只有5到6万兵力。中国没有空军,而美空中力量强大,如果中国佬敢来,必屠宰之(”There would be the greatest slaughter.")。 麦 克阿瑟对于苏联的判断是:苏联没有任何地面部队可以用于朝鲜战场(须知,苏联在二战中的伤亡为2千万人)。唯一的可能是,”Russian air support of Chinese ground troops." 但这种苏联空军与中国陆军组合,美军毫无畏惧,"We are the best." 会谈之后,杜鲁门吃了定心丸,对麦克阿瑟的分析非常满意 (Toland. p.241-2),对记者称,两人的观点取得了”complete unanimity"。麦克阿瑟获得了更大的自由决策权。 回过头看,麦克阿瑟对局势的判断非常准确,他正确的判断中国将出动地面部队,苏联将提供空中支援, 但无法提供地面部队。而他个人的军事政治目标其实是攻入中国。他的错误在于,低估了解放军的战斗效能。 中 国的角度与苏联完全不同,如果朝鲜局势对苏联无关痛痒,那么对中国来说涉及生死存亡。一旦美军攻陷整个朝鲜,陈兵中朝边境,那么中国将面临巨大的军事压 力。特别是中国当时的几乎全部电力和重工业都在东北,失去朝鲜的缓冲区,正所谓唇亡齿寒。因此当美军不顾中国的警告,越过38线,毛泽东决定无论苏联态度 如何,中国必须兵出朝鲜,御敌于国门之外。 彭 德怀在1950年10月20日会见金日成的时候,列出了三种可能;(1)中国军消灭联合国军,实现朝鲜问题的和平解决;(2)双方陷入僵持;或者(3)中 国军无法抵御联合国军,不得不撤回中国。对于第三种情况,中国已经考虑到联合国军可能会乘胜对中国境内实施打击,等于中国的解放将推迟数年。中国军的目标 当然是争取第一个结果。 美 军对于中国人的认识是基于唐人街华人逆来顺受的形象。在遭受中国军的猛烈打击之后,美第十集团军司令ALMOND给其师长们的指令仍然是:“Don't let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop you." 在美国排华法案下,美国华人从事的主要职业就是开洗衣店。而且开洗衣店还被美国当地政府制定歧视性条款加以限制。旧金山市政条例就规定,洗衣店不能开在木 头房子里,结果有人华人不服,继续在木房子里开洗衣店,被逮捕入狱。 联 合国军在中国军的打击下全面溃败之后,美国人这才知道真正的汉人是如此勇猛。麦克阿瑟向华盛顿发出电报,其腔调几乎是绝望的:”We face an entirely new war. This command has done everything possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and strength." 麦克阿瑟给出的建议是美军撤出朝鲜,退守日本。 美国政府陷入混乱。美国总统杜鲁门表示,一直在积极考虑在朝鲜战场使用核武器(早在仁川登陆之前,美国就曾考虑在朝鲜使用核武)。但美国的这个表示吓坏了英国与法国,因为虽然美国距离遥远,这两个欧洲国家却在苏联的核武威慑之下。